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Abstract 
In 2012, the European Union adopted a transformational change to its banking policy for the 
Eurozone. It dropped the model of decentralized supervision and regulatory competition 
between countries, and replaced it with a single supervisor and harmonization. Transferring 
banking supervision to the ECB also alters the existing constitutional order. The policy 
process leading to this transformational change was rapid and highly political, which was 
different compared to earlier incremental changes to banking policy. Kingdon's model, 
whereby policy entrepreneurs seize opportunities at times when the independent streams of 
solutions, problems and politics converge, partly explains this transformation. The study of 
EU banking policy suggests, however, that the multiple streams framework should pay more 
attention to the way in which entrepreneurs engineer fluctuations within the streams and 
thereby contribute to creating opportunities for change. This paper identifies the ECB as an 
effective entrepreneur which also played an active role in political bargaining. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At a summit meeting in June 2012, the European Union (EU) adopted a fundamental change 
to its banking policy for the Eurozone in response to the financial and sovereign debt crisis. 
This was not the first change of EU banking policy since the eruption of the crisis in 2008 but 
it was the only transformational one. It shifted the authority for supervising banks to the 
supranational level. Furthermore, the decision to entrust the ECB with exclusive banking 
supervision powers alters the nature of the central bank and its role in the governance of the 
Eurozone. It also paved the way for the creation of a larger banking union with a common 
resolution authority and fund. 
This paper argues in its first two sections that the change in banking supervision is 
transformational. In the wider debate on banking union, Epstein and Rhodes also contend that 
the Eurozone is experiencing a momentous loss of national control orchestrated by 
supranational actors 'against the perceived interests of many member states'2. Howarth and 
Quaglia call banking union 'one of the most significant developments in European 
integration'3 since the Maastricht Treaty. In contrast, others claim that national power politics 
blocked meaningful reform4. Howarth and Quaglia also stress the ambiguity and missing 
elements of banking union today. Similarly, McPhilemy5 argues that national discretion 
survives in a complex regulatory system that is moving towards a supranationalization of 
banking governance. 
                                                          
2 R. Epstein and M. Rhodes, "International in life, national in death? Banking nationalism on the road to banking 
union", Paper presented at ECPR meeting, Salamanca, 2014, p. 4. 
3 D. Howarth and L. Quaglia, "The steep road to European banking union: constructing the single resolution 
mechanism", Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(s1), 2014, p. 125. 
4 S. Donnelly, "Power politics and the undersupply of financial stability in Europe", Review of International 
Political Economy, 21(4), 2014, p. 1004-1006. 
5 S. McPhilemy, "Integrating rules, disintegrating markets: the end of national discretion in European banking?", 
Journal of European Public Policy, 21(10), 2014, p. 1486-1487. 
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The third and final section of this working paper uses its case study of banking 
supervision to propose an avenue for further research on what causes policy transformation. 
Adjustments in reaction to the banking crisis before 2012 built on the established policy 
legacy and were mostly prepared by experts inside public administrations. This incremental 
approach did not cumulate into a transformational change which happened through a different 
process that was rapid and highly political. Put differently, policy anomalies offered 
opportunities for change in various crisis situations before 2012. The resulting cognitive 
dissonance and policy learning were not sufficient factors for overthrowing the established 
model. Why were such opportunities not used, and what was different in 2012? The third 
section of this paper uses a multiple streams framework6 to address this question. Contrary to 
Kingdon, it states that the actions of a policy entrepreneur, in this case the European Central 
Bank (ECB), can engineer the opening of opportunities for policy change by helping to join 
the three independent streams of solutions, problems and politics. Thus, entrepreneurs are able 
to create and not just seize opportunities. That could only happen in 2012 when European 
Council politics had changed, partly in response to the actions of the policy entrepreneur at a 
moment of extreme uncertainty for the Eurozone. 
 
I  EU BANKING SUPERVISION BEFORE 2012 
With the creation of the single market at the end of the 1980s, the EU liberalized capital 
movements, and a 1989 banking directive eliminated obstacles to market integration by 
making the licence of one country valid in all others. The Commission pushed for an 
expansive set of supervisory powers for the home authority, which took charge of supervising 
                                                          
6 J. Kingdon, Agenda's, Alternatives, and Public Policies, New York, Longman, 2003. 
6 
 
branches and service provision in host countries, while member states insisted on national 
discretion for host authorities for transposing and applying regulatory standards. 
Advocates of the financial tri-lemma7 would predict that market integration cannot be 
combined with financial stability in the absence of centralized supervision. Indeed, 
coordination of supervisors was a constant concern during the phase of building the single 
market. EU rules were changed to impose more information exchanges and harmonize 
reporting, and colleges of supervisors were created in order to improve cross-border 
cooperation and settle disputes. New committees uniting all national authorities received a 
mandate for creating more convergence. Some analysts questioned whether this 'trans-
governmental networking' of national bodies would change the regulatory model and evolve 
into a new, independent source of authority8. Others, however, stressed the value of national 
flexibility and regulatory competition between countries for achieving economic efficiency, 
making a single supervisor undesirable9. 
The 2008 banking crisis revealed important anomalies which were endogenous to this 
'poly-archic European governance'10. Contagion spread across borders as soon as interbank 
lending froze. Given regulatory failure with the absence of loss-absorbing capital, 
governments had to resolve cross-border banks without prior planning and in spite of having 
memorandums of understanding for such contingencies, as required by EU law. A report for 
the European Commission11 listed various failures in the run-up to the crisis, including the 
                                                          
7 D. Schoenmaker, "The financial trilemma", Economics letters, 111(1), 2011, p. 57-59. 
8 E. Posner, "The Lamfalussy process: polyarchic origins of networked financial rule-making in the EU", p. 58, 
in C. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist governance in the European Union. Towards a new architecture, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. 
9 K. Lannoo, "Supervising the European financial system", CEPS policy brief 23, Brussels, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2002, p. 6-8. 
10 D. Mügge, "The political economy of Europeanized financial regulation", Journal of European Public Policy, 
20(3), 2013, p. 464. 
11 J. de Larosière, "Report of the high-level group on financial supervision in the EU", Brussels, European 
Commission, 2009, p. 39-42. 
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lack of willingness by peers to challenge home supervisors, lack of information exchange and 
co-operation, and ineffective supervision in countries that left loopholes in the single market. 
This collective action failure led to prisoner's dilemma type of interactions between 
governments with suboptimal outcomes for taxpayers. 
The Commission's initial response on resolving cross-border banks deepened 'the pre-
crisis coordinated regime'12 by insisting on national resolution and clearing national bank 
rescue plans under state aid rules. On supervision, the 2009 report by Jacques de Larosière 
rejected the option of a single supervisor as unrealistic and recommended the creation of a 
European Banking Authority (EBA) to organize a more formal coordination of national 
supervisors. The core functions of EBA relate to preparing regulatory standards that the 
Commission adopts in an attempt to foster more supervisory convergence, as well as settling 
disputes between supervisors through various forms of mediation. 
The Commission agreed at that time that a 'heavy-handed top-down approach' was not 
necessary13, while some within the ECB unsuccessfully tried to nudge decision-makers 
toward more centralization14. They did so without the support of the governing council where 
many members feared that taking charge of banking stability would threaten the discipline of 
an independent monetary policy. A policy window for creating a more integrated approach 
faded away. 
During the codecision process with the European Parliament (EP), many member 
states opposed envisaged EBA powers for giving direct instructions to their banks and 
generally resisted giving up regulatory autonomy. Germany's concern was fiscal liability for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
12 Z. Kudrna, "Cross-border resolution of failed banks in the European Union after the crisis: business as usual", 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(2), 2012, p. 296. 
13 J.-M. Barroso, "Europe: working together to shape a new financial system", Speech, 16 June 2009, p.3. 
14 J. de Larosière, op. cit., p. 42. 
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bank failures, while the UK protected its sovereignty and oversight of the City. Smaller 
countries in Eastern Europe resisted a weakening of their own supervision over foreign bank 
subsidiaries, especially those with high foreign ownership in their markets15. The compromise 
solution foresaw that EBA can overrule a national authority in narrowly defined conditions. 
 
2  THE CREATION OF A SINGLE SUPERVISOR AND THE NEW POLICY MODEL 
OF 2012 
The June 2012 Eurozone summit and European Council signified a breakthrough for 
transferring banking supervision to the ECB. It asked finance ministers to agree on this 
urgently given that effective European supervision became a precondition for the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) to directly recapitalize fragile banks without further liability for 
the sovereign, which was most crucial for Spain. This then developed over the next two years 
into the larger policy change of a banking union with common supervision, a single rulebook, 
harmonized amounts for national deposit insurance, and a semi-European resolution 
mechanism with gradually more common funding between 2014 and 2022. 
2.1 The Eurozone supervisor and the harmonization of standards 
While national leaders set out broad principles and a timeline on transferring 
sovereignty to the ECB, important decisions were still needed on the actual powers and 
governance of the central supervisor. The Commission worked closely with the ECB on these 
                                                          
15 A. Hennessy, "Redesigning financial supervision in the European Union (2009-2013)", Journal of European 
Public Policy, 21(2), 2014, p. 158; A. Spendzharova, "Is more 'Brussels' the solution? New European Union 
member states' preferences about the European financial architecture", Journal of Common Market Studies, 
20(2), 2012, p. 321-323. 
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questions in preparing its proposal that would have a decisive impact on the final outcome, 
which was agreed by the EP and Council in 2013. 
The new legislation that entered into force in November 2014 gives the ECB 
significant new powers. First, the central bank is exclusively in charge of issuing and 
withdrawing bank licenses, and must permit acquisitions and disposals of shareholdings. 
Thus, future national attempts to shield any Eurozone bank from foreign capital are likely to 
meet ECB resistance. Second, the ECB replaces national authorities for the direct supervision 
of approximately 130 institutions, which represent 85% of bank assets. As most of these 
banks operate across borders, the single supervisor will replace the current mechanisms for 
cooperation and dispute settlement between home and host supervisors. 
Third, the ECB gets all micro-prudential powers and can conduct on-site inspections. 
This is a remarkable shift in national preferences compared to two years earlier when the 
Council had opposed such powers for EBA. The broader implication of the transfer of micro-
prudential powers is that states give up influence over credit allocation by banks in their 
economy. The new micro-prudential powers are based on EU rules that implement the Basel 3 
recommendations, also known as Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive 4 (CRD4). 
Although the EU watered down some Basel guidelines16, the rules introduce more stringent 
capital standards and give supervisors more intrusive instruments. They scrap more than 100 
national discretions17. Specifically for the Eurozone, a large part of the national flexibility 
which the Council obtained compared to the Commission's proposal of maximum standards 
will be regulated by the ECB. 
                                                          
16 D. Howarth and L. Quaglia, "Banking on stability: the political economy of new capital requirements in the 
European Union", Journal of European Integration, 35(3), 2013, p. 336. 
17 L. Quaglia, "Financial regulation and supervision in the European Union after the crisis", Journal of Economic 
Policy Reform, 16(1), 2013, p. 20. 
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Fourth, the ECB can impose measures to prevent the deterioration of a balance sheet, 
such as divestments or remuneration limits. It can dismiss managers and trigger resolution 
whereby the new Single Resolution Board will have to restructure or wind down a bank. 
Hence, the ECB gets de facto powers over property rights in national jurisdictions, with 
limited redress for shareholders and creditors under new EU resolution rules. 
Fifth and at the request of the ECB18 (2012), macro-prudential powers and oversight 
over smaller banks will be shared with national supervisors. On the latter aspect, while 
Germany had initially argued for purely national supervision for its large number of smaller 
institutions, it eventually conceded to an integrated system with decentralized 
implementation. Within Germany, large cross-border banks, such as Deutsche Bank, lobbied 
for a single system against the association of saving banks. 
2.2 Why do new capital rules and a single supervisor transform banking policy for the 
Eurozone? 
The 2012 reform is not the continuation of an adjustment process but the introduction 
of a new approach. Harmonized rules and centralized supervision will put an end to an era 
whereby member states used the model of regulatory competition and mere supervisory 
coordination for protecting or expanding domestic banks. Giving exclusive powers to the 
ECB, with direct supervision over 85% of bank assets, changes the role of national 
governments in banking. Information on domestic banking systems will no longer be guarded 
nationally, and ECB powers will insulate supervision from national politics. The reform is 
also a choice for a hierarchical model that replaces attempts to reach supervisory convergence 
through trans-governmental networking, although that model survives for the whole of the 
single market through the EBA. 
                                                          
18 European Central Bank, "Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 November 2012", CON/2012/96. 
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Beyond banking policy, transferring supervision to the ECB is a change of a 
constitutional order that alters parliamentary accountability. For this reason, the EP postponed 
its opinion on the draft legislation until the conclusion of a detailed inter-institutional 
agreement with the ECB, which includes transparency requirements, regular reporting and 
confidential hearings. Finally, obtaining supervisory powers also changes the nature of the 
ECB itself. The new governance structure installs a supervisory board that operates 
independently from the governing council which remains focused on monetary policy. Yet, 
the supervisory board still needs the tacit approval of the council. A new mediation board will 
deal with differences of opinion, though the governing council keeps the ultimate authority in 
line with the Treaty. Entrusting the ECB with both a monetary and a banking stability mission 
reflects a deeper shift in economic thinking, as it drops the assumption that monetary stability 
and low inflation are sufficient conditions for deregulating the financial sector and 
maintaining stability. 
Other pillars of banking union beyond the single rulebook and supervision have not 
seen a similar quantum leap so far. National vetoes remain in place for activating the ESM 
allocation of €60bn for direct recapitalizations. The Commission shied away from proposing a 
European deposit insurance scheme. In resolution the picture is more blurred. On the one 
hand, Germany diminished the degree of supranational autonomy for a resolution mechanism 
advocated by member states such as France, Italy and Spain. But on the other hand, its 
agreement for German banks to pay levies into a European fund is a major breakthrough for a 
truly integrated market, even though the absence of a European backstop may still lead to 
divergences in national bank funding costs19. This development towards more solidarity and 
                                                          
19 A. Ubide, "How to form a more perfect European banking union?", Policy Brief 13-23, Washington DC, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2013, p. 6. 
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joint approaches could only happen in the presence of a European supervisor that should 
guarantee the elimination of national supervisory forbearance. 
 
3  EXPLAINING POLICY CHANGE 
In 2010, during negotiations with the EP on the creation of the EBA, Eurozone countries 
resisted taking steps towards a transfer of authority to the supranational level while they 
embraced such a transfer two years later. What can explain this redefinition of national 
preferences in such a short time? Students of EU banking policy have often found analytical 
strength in political economy factors, deriving national preferences for policy choices from 
the structure of the domestic industry. But that cannot account for the 2012 reversal. Another 
argument would claim that the internationalization of major banks and their powerful 
lobbying for streamlined rule-making contributed to centralization. Yet, in Europe banking 
has retrenched to national markets since 2008 and lobbying by cross-border banks in 2012 
was not different from earlier years. Other explanations would stress the role of ideas and 
policy learning on how to govern a single banking market better as a result of the crisis. Yet 
again, even when crisis moments revealed policy anomalies before 2012, advocacy for 
transformational change failed and the response was incremental. Hennessy20 attributes this to 
the member states' uncertainty over the cost distribution that would follow centralization. 
What was different in 2012 is that the development of the sovereign debt crisis had 
become an opportunity for changing EU banking policy, whereas decision-makers had earlier 
kept those two issues separate. Thus, a crucial question is by whom and how were these two 
spheres linked? The following section uses the model of the three independent streams of 
                                                          
20 Op. cit., p. 164-165. 
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problems, solutions and politics which contends that time is a more important factor for 
understanding policy change than a rational search for an optimal output. It shows, as 
expected, that the coupling of the streams was needed for transformational change. It also 
suggests, however, that entrepreneurship can engineer such a coupling and open window of 
opportunities for change. Kingdon's proposition is that opportunities open 'because of some 
factor beyond the realm of the individual entrepreneur'21, such as exogenous shocks, problem 
indicators or political changes. Hence, this study of change in EU banking policy contains an 
avenue for further research on how to strengthen the causality of Kingdon's widely used 
model22 by stressing more strongly the strategic motivation of entrepreneurial action. In this 
case, that action was located at supranational level inside the ECB. 
3.1 The policy stream: banking union as a recombination of existing ideas 
The idea of entrusting the ECB with supervisory powers has been floating in policy 
circles for more than twenty years. In the Maastricht Treaty, negotiators settled on an enabling 
clause that empowers the Council to give prudential powers to the ECB by unanimity. 
Member states resisted going further, in particular Germany for fear of compromising the 
central banks' independence and because the Bundesbank argued that a prudential task 'could 
be misinterpreted as a lender-of-last-resort function'23. 
The idea that a currency union with free capital flows could have banking stability 
without centralized supervision was contested early on by international organizations, 
                                                          
21 Op. cit., p. 182. 
22 Recently: R. Ackrill et al., "Ambiguity, multiple streams, and EU policy", Journal of European Public Policy, 
20(6), 2013; P. Copeland and S. James, "Policy windows, ambiguity and Commission entrepreneurship: 
explaining the relaunch of the European Union's economic reform agenda", Journal of European Public Policy, 
21(1), 2014. 
23 H. James, Making the European Monetary Union. The role of the committee of central bank governors and the 
origins of the European Central Bank, Cambridge MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012, p. 
292. 
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academics and senior ECB staff. The IMF24 deplored the lack of institutional clarity on the 
handling of a bank crisis, while the OECD25 predicted that the unsecured nature of interbank 
lending would propagate instability across borders. It urged the ECB to anticipate a credit 
crunch by spelling out its policy for collateral requirements in exchange for liquidity, and 
concluded that the central bank should be the supervisor. With foresight, De Grauwe26 
designed a scenario of a Spanish asset boom fuelled by low interest rates and capital inflows 
from other Eurozone countries in the absence of any exchange rate risk and proper assessment 
of the banks. ECB board member Padoa-Schioppa27 called for a 'collective euro area 
supervisor' that should work as effectively as 'within a single nation', anticipating a formal 
request by the ECB28 to the Council to become a supervisory hub. 
Centre-left governments at the time, however, were moving in an opposite direction. 
Following the twin peaks model, Germany and the UK took powers away from their central 
banks, which kept a monitoring function while a new body took charge of actual supervision 
with an eye on the possible creation of a single supervisor for banks and capital markets. This 
happened at a time when German banks became more active in international trading and 
investment. After a clash with the ECB, EU finance ministers decided in 2002 to create a 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). Together with a European Banking 
Committee, these forums allowed national supervisors to shape technical standards and 
exchange information in an attempt to harmonize implementation. Like with EBA later on, 
however, coordination was ambiguous as the model also aimed at fostering regulatory 
                                                          
24 International Monetary Fund, "International capital markets – developments, prospects, and key policy issues", 
Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, 1998, p. 106. 
25 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "EMU one year on", Paris, OECD, 2000, p. 71-
72. 
26 P. De Grauwe,"The euro and financial crises", Financial Times, 20 February 1998. 
27 T. Padoa-Schioppa, "EMU and banking supervision", Speech, 24 February 1999. 
28 European Central Bank, "The role of central banks in prudential supervision", Frankfurt, 2001. 
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competition and national discretion, leaving CEBS unable to produce substantive 
convergence29. 
The idea of a European supervisor disappeared from policy discussions once the 2002 
window of opportunity in the Council had not been used. Furthermore, the problem stream 
did not generate negative feedback. On the contrary, up to 2007 interest rates in the Eurozone 
converged and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) displayed its expected impact of 
channelling excess savings from surplus countries into investments elsewhere. A light touch 
national regulation seemed to allocate capital more efficiently across borders also in the single 
market as a whole, with many banks expanding operations in Eastern Europe. 
When the banking crisis hit in 2008, advocacy for policy change by decision-makers 
focused initially more on joint efforts for bank restructuring and resolution than on central 
supervision. In October 2008, the French EU presidency mooted an idea for a European 
guarantee scheme which Germany rejected because of fiscal liability concerns. The IMF 
argued from the start of the sovereign debt crisis in favour of a European resolution authority 
'armed with the mandate and the tools to resolve large cross-border banks'30. For creditor 
countries, this raised the danger of moral hazard whereby they would have to clean up the 
consequences of irresponsible bank behaviour and failed national supervision in other 
countries. The idea of sequencing the policy by creating a European supervisor before 
committing jointly to bank liabilities failed to emerge on the decision agenda. 
In 2011 the concept of banking union started taking shape outside of decision-making 
circles. The think tank Bruegel drew attention to the need for 'banking federalism'31 and 
                                                          
29 McPhilemy, Op. cit., p. 1480. 
30 W. Fonteyne et al., "Crisis management and resolution for a European banking system", Working Paper 10/70, 
Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, 2010, p. 5. 
31 N. Véron, "Testimony on the European debt and financial crisis", Bruegel policy contribution 2011/11, 
Brussels, Bruegel, 2011. 
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demonstrated that the fate of banks and sovereigns was intertwined to the point that solid 
banks in weaker countries would have to shrink their balance sheet, while poorly run ones in 
stronger economies could expand32. This situation aggravated the economic imbalances 
between Eurozone countries, and the higher investment cost in vulnerable economies 
compared to the Eurozone core started a vicious circle with an increase in non-performing 
loans for banks which in turn threatened the sovereign's credibility due to possible bailouts. 
All the same, this vicious circle did not affect the definition of the problem by the separated 
policy communities in banking and sovereign debt matters. The concept of 'banking union' to 
break the bank-sovereign doom loop only started getting some mileage after it appeared for 
the first time in a December 2011 editorial by Véron33. To reach the decision agenda, 
however, the Euro crisis needed to be defined as a banking issue. Such redefinition of the 
problem is beyond the powers of policy experts. 
3.2 The changing recognition of the policy problem 
In the initial period of the debt crisis from early 2010 until the end of 2011, attention 
of policy-makers went mostly to national fiscal discipline in order to regain bond market 
confidence. The template was one of loans in exchange for market-oriented reforms and 
privatizations in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The structure of that policy, designed firstly for 
Greece, was applied for the second time to Ireland at the end of 2010, when the Irish two year 
unlimited guarantee for bank deposits, debt and securities ended. The reproduction of the 
policy template for Greece avoided the recognition of the Irish case as a banking problem. 
While ESM loans confined the zombie state of Irish banks to the national arena, 
another policy response weakened sovereigns with fragile banks. After EU banking policy 
                                                          
32 C. Angeloni and G. Wolff, "Are banks affected by their holdings of government debt?", Bruegel working 
paper 2012/07, Brussels, Bruegel, 2012; see also P. De Grauwe, "The governance of a fragile euro zone", CEPS 
working document 346, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011. 
33 N. Véron, "Europe must change course on banks", Vox CEPR's Policy Portal, 22 December 2011. 
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incurred a loss of credibility with financial markets following the EBA stress tests, the 
European Council decided in October 2011 to bring the tougher Basel 3 capital ratio's forward 
in time. Where markets would fail to provide new capital to banks, 'national government 
should provide support' if necessary by taking out an EU loan34. This decision coincided with 
the negotiations on public borrowing limits in the fiscal compact. One month after the 
summit, the German Chancellor attempted at the G20 to cajole Spain and Italy into a 
preventative adjustment programme but failed in doing so35. 
This episode is important for understanding that politics prevented the opening of the 
policy window on banking union in 2011. The dominant approach of national responsibility 
for fiscal discipline supported by ESM loans left no room for other policy choices, and the 
idea of European banking supervision was never discussed. Furthermore, the counterfactual is 
crucial. If Spain had consented to an adjustment programme before spring 2012, the window 
of opportunity for banking policy would most likely not have opened. Bank recapitalizations 
would have been managed in negotiations with the Troika. Spain's power to shape the policy 
agenda lied in its refusal to take out Eurozone loans for nearly one year, which put the 
spotlight on its deteriorating banks, something Ireland had never managed to do. By the time 
Ireland called on support in 2010, its budget had incorporated huge bank liabilities while 
Spain still had a manageable debt to GDP ratio of around 60% at the end of 2011. Yet, 
speculation on the uncertainty of its banking sector amounted to an extra capital need of 
nearly 10% of Spanish GDP and weakened the sovereign's capacity to refinance itself. The 
                                                          
34 Euro Area Summit Statement, 26 October 2011.  
35 J.-L. Zapatero, El Dilema. 600 días de vértigo, Madrid, Planeta, 2013, p. 290-292; F. Van Damme and M. 
Peeperkorn, "Mario Monti: Ik heb Russische roulette gespeeld met de toekomst van Italië", De Morgen, 12 April 
2014. 
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banking issue in Spain served as a 'focusing event'36 that redefined the nature of the Euro 
crisis, thereby creating conditions for a more innovative decision agenda. 
From its side, the ECB under governor Draghi announced in December 2011 a change 
in its bank liquidity support that would reinforce bank exposures to their own sovereign. Up 
until then the ECB had expanded its bank funding toolbox with emergency and medium-term 
liquidity operations. The new action of a Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) had an 
unprecedented maturity of three years. The bulk of the net injection of around €520bn went to 
Spanish and Italian banks whose states faced major debt refinancing operations at that 
particular time. Thus, the ECB took a stopgap action to reduce market pressure, knowing that 
the nexus between banks and sovereigns would intensify. Earlier, in summer of 2011, it had 
contained sovereign refinancing problems via the Securities Market Programme which had 
bought bonds for a value of around 2% of Eurozone GDP. Such purchases were made 
conditional on fiscal rigour and market reforms. Continuing this bond purchasing in 2012 
would have resulted in accumulating more Italian debt on the ECB balance sheet and a 
reputational risk. 
3.3 European Council politics and policy entrepreneurship 
In 2012, the ECB was the first EU actor to advocate a centralization of supervision 
and resolution, before the Commission, member states, or the President of the European 
Council. At the same time as the LTRO and in the space of six weeks, three relatively new 
members of its executive board publicly requested radical change. In February 2012, Peter 
Praet was the first to depart from the prevailing discourse and urged to step up the level of 
                                                          
36 J. Kingdon, Op. cit., p. 94-100. 
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ambition beyond the supervisory authorities such as EBA37. Praet proposed a more 
centralized architecture and pushed for an ESM mandate for recapitalizing big banks. One 
week later, Benoit Coeuré proposed pan-European financing for resolution and urged policy-
makers 'to be more ambitious – now'38. Later in March, Jörg Asmussen, the German 
replacement of Jürgen Stark who had resigned over the ECB's bond-buying programme, 
echoed the need for 'a special fund for bank resolution' but specifically 'at the euro area level 
accompanied by the establishment of a joint supervisory and resolution regime'39. Proposing a 
specific Eurozone approach for financial services broke a taboo on the integrity of the single 
market and the inclusion of London's City in EU financial regulation. One month later, Mario 
Draghi40 made his first public call for European banking supervision and resolution. 
Two factors explain the push by the ECB for a banking union at that particular 
juncture, in addition to a long-standing preference for more centralized supervision and a shift 
in its crisis role from guarantor of price stability to guardian of 'the sustainability of EMU as 
such'41. First, there was a change in governor and board members, which brought in some new 
thinking. In this reshuffle the new German board member Asmussen took charge of banking 
union issues and liaised informally with the German government. Second, the scale of the 
LTRO increased the chances of moral hazard behaviour by national supervisors. Former 
board member Bini Smaghi42 writes that a central bank without supervisory powers is 'unable 
to assess whether the liquidity injected into the banking system […] risked creating 
                                                          
37 P. Praet, "Sound money, sound finances, a competitive economy – principles of a European culture of 
stability", Speech, 27 February 2012. 
38 B. Coeuré, "The reform of financial regulation – priorities from a European Central Bank perspective", 
Speech, 6 March 2012, p. 3. 
39 A. Barker and P. Spiegel, "ECB policy maker calls for bank crisis plan", Financial Times, 30 March 2012. 
40 M. Draghi, "Introductory statement - Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the 
European Parliament", 25 April 2012. 
41 F. Torres, "The EMU's legitimacy and the ECB as a strategic political player in the crisis context", Journal of 
European Integration, 35(3), 2013, p. 297. 
42 L. Bini Smaghi, Austerity. European democracies against the wall, Brussels, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2013, p. 89. 
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distortions'. Moreover, national supervisors in the single currency area have an incentive to 
underestimate solvency problems in order to allow their banks to gain access to ECB 
liquidity, such as the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). After his mandate, Trichet43 
stated that bank funding schemes had to be 'correctly transmitted by the supervisory 
authorities in each particular jurisdiction' to be effective. 
Only in 2012, however, did the ECB make public statements to end fragmented 
supervision. Inside the bank a legal team was put to work to determine the maximum level of 
ambition that was possible under the ambiguity of the Treaty's enabling clause. Those who 
argued against taking on financial stability tasks for fear of a conflict of interest with 
monetary policy were curtailed by arguments that emphasized the need for an urgent solution 
based on an existing legal basis. Thus, unconventional central bank actions and an expansion 
of ECB tools to tackle the debt crisis ultimately spilled over into a formal expansion of its 
competences. 
The ECB had the reputation and position of authority that form essential features for 
effective entrepreneurship44, and it used these to support its advocacy prior to the opening of a 
window of opportunity. But the ECB lacked a third entrepreneurial feature, namely the 
political capacity to build a supporting alliance. It worked in tandem with the European 
Council President who used his agenda-setting capacity for this purpose and became the hub 
of a deal-making process. In May 2012, national leaders asked the European Council 
President, at his own suggestion, to submit a report on building a stronger EMU to their June 
meeting45. This was a juncture of the crisis characterized by extreme market pressure with 
bond spreads at record levels, fuelling expectations of a Eurozone break-up. An intense 
                                                          
43 J.-C. Trichet, "Unconventional monetary policy measures: principles, conditions, raison d'être", International 
Journal of Central Banking, 9(1), 2013, p. 239. 
44 J. Kingdon, Op. cit., p. 180-181. 
45 European Council, "Towards a genuine economic and monetary union. Report by President of the European 
Council Herman van Rompuy", 26 June 2012. 
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process of inter-élite persuasion with eleven versions of the Van Rompuy report happened in 
the space of a few weeks, whereby the ECB governor became involved in political bargaining 
on the transfer of supervisory powers to the European level, supported by the French 
President and Italian Prime Minister. 
While the ECB's entrepreneurial advocacy helped shift national preferences and 
European Council politics, thereby enabling the coupling of a problem to a solution that had 
been floating for two decades in the policy stream, it was not a sufficient factor to create the 
right political conditions for transformational change. Member states had gone through a 
learning process on contagion risks in a single currency area since the creation of EBA in 
201046. Beyond this ideational shift, more research is needed on why key member states 
changed their cost-benefit calculation on centralizing banking supervision. France, for 
instance, had a general preference for creating joint instruments for crisis management and 
came to accept centralized supervision as a precondition. At that particular juncture in 2012, 
an important additional factor was that the cost of supervising national banks had increased 
due to spill-over effects of the debt crisis. Donnelly47 attributes French support to an 
impending credit rating decline. Earlier, in the summer of 2011, US money market funds had 
reduced their exposure to French banks because of the Euro crisis48, leading to dollar funding 
problems. Germany from its side argued that a central control mechanism was needed before 
it could agree to ESM direct recapitalization. But both central supervision and recapitalization 
were concessions to a supranational model that Germany had so far resisted, as it would add 
to the liabilities it had already undertaken for sovereigns. The change coincided with the 
Chancellor's choice to defend the Eurozone's integrity at all cost and drop the option of 
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47 S. Donnelly, Op. cit., p. 991. 
48 International Monetary Fund, "Staff country reports – France", Washington DC, IMF, 2013, p. 8-9. 
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countries exiting the Euro49. Finally, the UK had decided in 2011 to abandon its opposition to 
a two-speed EU financial services policy. It argued for more Eurozone integration and 
strongly supported a Eurozone supervisor when the idea emerged on the decision agenda in 
May 2012, partly out of interest for a return to stability in its biggest export market. 
The spring and summer of 2012 were particularly turbulent times with high 
uncertainty over future developments and a wide variety of policy ideas floating around. By 
June, the cost of inaction could have been enormous. Pollack defines uncertainty and cost of 
waiting as factors that boost supranational autonomy in agenda-setting. In this context, the 
ECB's push for a new supervisory architecture became a focal point for bargaining and for the 
convergence of the 'uncertain preferences of the member governments'50. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper demonstrates that there has been an overhaul of Eurozone banking policy with new 
and exclusive ECB powers for supervision, harmonized rules and standards. This has allowed 
to kick-start a process towards creating a single European resolution body and fund. In the 
areas of fiscal and economic union, in contrast, no such policy transformations took place, 
leaving the Euro exposed to the absence of 'institutional embeddedness'51. While fiscal and 
economic policy saw adjustments in their instruments, they never experienced a radical 
alteration of their established approach that is today still based on the Maastricht parameters, 
national flexibility and sanctions for non-compliance. 
                                                          
49 P. Spiegel, "Inside Europe's plan Z", Financial Times, 14 March 2014. 
50 M. Pollack, "Delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the European Community", International 
Organization, 51(1), 1997, p. 130. 
51 M. Matthijs and M. Blyth, "Chapter 12: conclusion. The future of the Euro: possible future, risks and 
uncertainties", p. 4, in: M. Matthijs and M. Blyth (eds), The future of the Euro, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming. 
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Transformational change in banking policy happened through a sudden and highly political 
process. Without ignoring an element of randomness that characterizes the multiple streams 
framework, this paper showed the causality behind the decision to centralize banking 
supervision in 2012 and not earlier. ECB actions helped to engineer the coupling of the 
solution and problem streams and actively contributed to the opening of the window of 
opportunity. While not being a formal decision-maker, the ECB became part of the bargaining 
process whereas Kingdon situates entrepreneurs mostly outside of the decision-making 
circle52. Within the ECB, an important shift in thinking had occurred on the need to combine 
both monetary and financial stability tasks, partly as a result of a frequent use of new and 
unconventional instruments to ensure the survival of EMU. The need to act urgently in 2012 
marginalized those who argued inside the ECB that taking on banking supervision would 
conflict with the independence of monetary policy and the setting of interest rates. A few 
weeks after the European Council had endorsed centralized banking supervision for the 
Eurozone, the ECB governor further expanded the central banks' toolbox with the Outright 
Monetary Transactions programme, which entails unlimited purchases of government bonds 
in secondary markets in exchange for economic reforms. 
For member states, the main stumbling block towards a supranational approach before 
2012 was national fiscal liability and accountability. Thus, in 2010 the exogenous shock of 
the banking crisis, rapid policy learning, and the availability of alternative policy solutions 
were not sufficient to cause transformational change, and no entrepreneur came forward to 
make a strong case for centralized supervision. The same stumbling block of national fiscal 
liability was still in place in 2012. Eurozone countries, however, looked at it differently in 
view of the lessons that they had learnt from the sovereign debt crisis, which altered their 
                                                          
52 R. Ackrill et al., Op. cit., p. 881. 
24 
 
cost-benefit analysis of banking union in June 2012. While in 2010 member states analysed 
banking problems in isolation from the debt crisis, that situation had changed dramatically in 
2012. The June 2012 moment of high uncertainty over the best way forward for banking 
policy and for managing the Euro crisis considerably improved the conditions for effective 
supranational entrepreneurship and making national preferences converge around a major 
innovation. 
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